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"DURING WAR, THE LAW IS SILENT," OR IS IT?:
EXAMINING THE LEGAL STATUS OF
GUANTANAMO BAY
Kate Frisch
I. INTRODUCTION
On the morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen men,
equipped with box cutters and knives, hijacked four American com-
mercial airplanes. At approximately 9:00 am, American Airlines Flight
11 and United Airlines Flight 175 were intentionally crashed into the
north and south towers of the World Trade Center in lower Manhat-
tan, leaving an immense hole in the 80th floor of the 110-story build-
ing.1 Hundreds were instantly killed or trapped inside the burning
structure. At 9:37 am, American Airlines Flight 77 dove into the Pen-
tagon in Washington, D.C. Twenty-six minutes later, United Airlines
Flight 93 crashed into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.2 6,333
were initially declared missing, and ultimately an estimated 3,000
were declared dead.a
The attacks were orchestrated by members of an Islamic mili-
tant organization known as Al Qaeda, which had connections with the
Taliban regime' in Afghanistan, and marked the deadliest attack on
American soil by foreign hands that the country had ever experienced.
The events of September 11, 2001 forced the world to reconsider the
role of non-state actors and terrorism as a legitimate and imminent
threat to the order and peace that the international sphere inherently
craves. As Cofer Black, the then head of the CIA Counterterrorist
Center stated, "there was a before 9/11, and there was an after 9/11.
1 COLLEEN E. HARDY, THE DETENTION OF UNLAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANTS DURING
THE WAR ON TERROR 4 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed. 2009); September 11th Fast Facts,
CNN, (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.cnn.com2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniver
sary-fast-facts/.
2 See Hardy, supra note 1, at 4.
3 VICTOR JELENIEWSKI SEIDLER, REMEMBERING 9/11 TERROR, TRAUMA, AND SOCIAL
THEORY, 35 (2013).
4 At the time of the attacks, the Taliban was considered to be the controlling gov-
ernment in Afghanistan, as it was governing the majority of the country. Only
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Pakistan ever officially recognized
the Taliban as the lawful government of Afghanistan. Instead, Al Qaeda is a ter-
rorist organization that spans numerous nationalities and countries. See Heather
L. Rooney, Parlaying Prisoner Protections: A Look at the International Law and
Supreme Court Decisions that Should be Governing our Treatment of Guantanamo
Detainees. 54 DRAKE L. REV. 679. 696-97 (2006).
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After 9/11 the gloves come off."5 As a consequence of the terrorist at-
tacks, the United States, and many other members of the interna-
tional community, categorized the attacks as an act of war, and
President George W. Bush declared that America had begun its in-
volvement in the infamous global war on terror.6
The introduction of terrorist attacks on American soil, com-
bined with the unpredictable nature of terrorism and the shifting in-
ternational focus, which now centered upon the very real threat of
unpredictable non-state actors, reverberated throughout the global
arena and was transferred into the regime of international public law.
While this was not the first instance of terrorism by non-state actors
against the United States in modern history,7 it served as the contem-
porary proverbial shot heard 'round the world. One of the strategies
involved in the implementation of the war on terror was to send sev-
eral hundred Taliban and Al Qaeda militants whom United States
forces had captured to detention centers at Guantanamo Bay, a United
States naval base in Cuba.'
5 Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations,
WASH. POST, (Dec. 26, 2002), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti
cle/2006/06/09/AR2006060901356.html.
6 EMILY CRAWFORD, THE TREATMENT OF COMBATANTS AND INSURGENTS UNDER THE
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 56 (2010).
7 Throughout the 1990's, the United States faced attacks both on a domestic scale
as well as abroad. The only attack carried out inside the borders of the United
States was the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, which was engineered and car-
ried out by Islamic fundamentalists who sought revenge for the Palestinian people
who had suffered from the U.S. aiding of Israel. But, there were at least six other
successful or planned attacks against the U.S. during this time period as well.
Attacks included the bombing of a military base in Saudi Arabia in 1996, almost
concurrent attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the planned
bombings of the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels and the U.N. building in NYC, and
the 2000 U.S.S. Cole bombing. See 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, CNN, (Mar.
2, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/05/us/1993-world-trade-center-bombing-
fast-facts/; David Hodari, Main suspect behind 1996 bombing of US military base
residence in Saudi Arabia arrested, TELEGRAPH, (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.tele
graph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/saudiarabia/11825664/Main-suspect-be
hind- 1996-bombing-of-US-military-base-residence-in-Saudi-Arabia-arrested.html;
1998 U.S. Embassies in Africa Fast Facts, CNN, (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.cnn.
com/2013/10/06/world/africa/africa-embassy-bombings-fast-facts/; Joseph P. Fried,
The Terror Conspiracy: The Overview; Sheik and 9 Followers Guilty of a Conspir-
acy of Terrorism, NY TIMES, (Oct. 2, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/02/ny
region/terror-conspiracy-overview-sheik-9-followers-guilty-conspiracy-terrorism.
html?pagewanted=all; USS Cole Bombing Fast Facts, CNN, (Apr. 6, 2016), http:/l
www.cnn.con2013/09/18/world/meastluss-cole-bombing-fast-facts/.
8 Peter L. Bergen, September 11 Attacks, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (May 17,
2016), https://www.britannica.com/event/September-11-attacks.
LEGAL STATUS OF GUANTANAMO BAY
The use of Guantanamo Bay as an extraterritorial detention
center intended to house what the United States deems as "unlawful
enemy combatants" has been problematic for several reasons. First,
the United States government has argued that Guantanamo exists
outside of its immediate territorial sovereignty, and therefore the de-
tainees do not have to be afforded any significant procedural and sub-
stantive legal protections under the Constitution.' As Guantanamo
Bay is not part of the United States' immediate territory, despite the
continued exercise of direct and exclusive control over the naval base,
the government has been able to practically ensure that detainees can-
not rely on the Constitution to protect their basic rights or liberties.1
°
Second, it is unclear how and to what extent United States ac-
tivities in Guantanamo Bay conform to international human rights
standards.1 ' Significantly, it has been questioned whether or to what
extent public international and human rights law even can be applied
to Guantanamo Bay, as the detention center serves as a seemingly ex-
traterritorial "extension" of the United States that technically falls
outside of its sovereign grasp. 2 The use of seemingly jurisdictional no-
man's land in which there is a definitive exercise of control by a state,
but without the requisite sovereignty piece, such as with Guantanamo
Bay, has caused some to suggest that these extraterritorial state activ-
ities exist in a "legal black hole."13 Under this notion, the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay can therefore be lawfully denied basic rights and
protections under public international law because they have been
deemed to superficially exist outside of the responsibility of any one
state. 14
Supreme Court decisions beginning in 2004 have limited the
scope of the "legal black hole" on a domestic scale, 15 but the potency of
the ambiguous nature of extraterritorial state activities has yet to be
definitively resolved under international human rights law. If Guanta-
namo does actually exist in such a hole, it insinuates that such detain-
ees do not have to be afforded procedural and substantive rights under
public international law. This holds grave consequences in terms of
the protection of the detainees' basic human rights as well as the per-
ceived strength and legitimacy of human rights law.
9 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
10 See Wilde, infra, note 11.
11 Ralph Wilde, Legal "Black Hole"? Extraterritorial State Action and Interna-
tional Treaty Law on Civil and Political Rights, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 739, 740
(2005).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See id.
15 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.Ct. 2633,
2639 (2004); Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2242 (2008).
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Instead, I argue that international human rights law precludes
the existence of any "legal black hole." Human rights law protects the
rights and liberties of individuals purely based on their status as
human beings, regardless of their location. 6 Therefore, an individual's
rights cannot be suspended. As a result, it must be the responsibility of
the entity that holds custody and control over the individual to protect
those rights. In order to enforce the protection of human rights, inter-
national responsibilities stemming from treaties that have solidified
the individual nature of the rights must be used as an instrument for
enforcement to protect the legitimacy of human rights. Specifically, in
the case of Guantanamo Bay, the United States is formally obligated
to uphold such individual protections due to its commitments stem-
ming from the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention
Against Torture (CAT).' 7
This argument will be explored throughout the rest of the pa-
per, as Part II discusses the history of the detention centers; Part III
outlines the human rights violations that have occurred at Guanta-
namo, and; Part IV analyzes the legal obligations set forth in the trea-
ties to which the United States is a party,' s and fleshes out the
arguments surrounding the existence of a "legal black hole."
On a theoretical level, the ability of states to suspend human
rights based on where certain individuals may be located at a certain
point in time devolves the stability, legitimacy, and ultimate underpin-
nings of human rights law. As Eleanor Roosevelt posited:
Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In
small places, close to home - so close and so small that
they cannot be seen on any maps of the world. Yet, they
are the world of the individual person... Such are the
places where every man, woman and child seeks equal
justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without discrim-
ination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they
have little meaning anywhere. Without concerned citizen
16 Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for
Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers, 4, http://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications
/training9chapterlen.pdf.
17 See generally Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Geneva, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.135; UN General Assembly, International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty
Series, vol. 999, 171, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aaO.html; UN General
Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465,
85.
18 Specifically, the Third Geneva Convention, the ICCPR, and the CAT.
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action to uphold them close to home, we shall look in
vain for progress in the larger world19
To say that human rights attach based on a person's location ignores
the fact that rights are triggered purely by the person being a person,
and to say otherwise dissolves the underlying premise of human
rights. The right to equal justice, opportunity, and dignity without dis-
crimination cannot be diminished because of an individual's territorial
movement in the world and to assert such a notion would inject chaos
into an already vulnerable system. To argue that such freedoms can be
suspended purely based on location diminishes the progress of the in-
ternational community and ignores the ultimate purpose of human
rights law in the first place.
Human rights under public international law was established
to fill the inherent gap seen between state protections and the mallea-
ble and ambiguous international system due to a global policy move-
ment following the atrocities seen during World War II2 ° The global
movement that sparked the solidification of human rights was pre-
mised upon the idea that such rights attach and are triggered at birth
and are not dependent upon the individual's territorial status.2 1 In the
most simplified terms, human rights are derived from being human
and cannot be awarded or withheld by any particular government or
single legal system. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the interna-
tional system as a whole to recognize the individual status of these
rights, and that the United States' treatment of detainees at Guanta-
namo Bay violates its international legal obligations set forth in the
human rights instruments to which it is a party.
But in its current use, the law is not protecting against the vio-
lation of human rights despite clear obligations established in various
treaties. Instead, it is being twisted to allow such violations to be initi-
ated while avoiding the consequences of law.22 For example, the defini-
tion of torture has been redefined to allow for its proliferation at
Guantanamo against "unlawful enemy combatants", which is a term
created by the Bush Administration in order to avoid the reach of the
applicable law.2" The alleged distinction between "unlawful enemy
combatants" and "lawful enemy combatants" has allowed the United
19 Eleanor Roosevelt, On the Adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, Address at the United Nations in New York (Mar. 27, 1958).
20 See Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human
Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers, supra note 16, at 2,3.
21 "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, art.1; Larry Cox & John Yoo, Are Human Rights
Universal, 16 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 9, 13 (2009).
22 Id.
23 Id.
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States to exempt some human beings from having human rights. The
term "enemy combatants" refers to individuals who are able to be le-
gally detained during an armed conflict under the laws of war.2 4
"Lawful enemy combatants" and "unlawful enemy combatants" have
been treated differently under international law.2 5
If the United States defined the detainees as "lawful," they
would be granted prisoner of war status, and thus protections stem-
ming from the Third Geneva Convention. 26 But by defining the detain-
ees at Guantanamo as "unlawful enemy combatants," they did not
receive such protections. The Bush Administration instituted the hy-
brid term of "unlawful enemy combatants" as it proliferated the argu-
ment that the detainees were exempt from the typical protections of
war. As this was coupled with the fact that technically Guantanamo
exists outside of the direct sovereign territory of the United States, the
government was able to effectively allege that the detainees exist in a
"legal black hole." Yet, the consequences of the notion that individuals
can be located beyond the reach of law ignores the fact that human
rights are dependent upon the person, not the place or a superficial
status. Such rights are secured to the individual, and are inalienable
and cannot be diminished. To do so would devolve the status of human
rights law, and would initiate the type of chaos which the regime
sought to protect against in the first place.
While this paper will focus specifically on Guantanamo Bay, it
serves as a case study for the legality of the use of extraterritorial
state activities to detain, interrogate, and torture individuals who are
deemed a national security concern, and the manner in which such
activities are performed. The abuses that have occurred at Guanta-
namo Bay are not only an unintended consequence of the detention
centers in Cuba, but also describe a systematic global reality and
concern.
Responsibility for the abuse of human rights at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, lies also with the foreign governments that participated in
and allowed the United States to operate the secret prisons.2" The con-
cerns surrounding the human rights abuses at extraterritorial deten-
24 William Haynes, Enemy Combatants, COUNCIL FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS (Dec.
12, 2002), http://www.cfr.org/international-law/enemy-combatants/p5312.
25 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1942).
26 See Convention Relative to the'Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, (Aug. 12,
1949), 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
27 Allison M. Danner, Defining Unlawful Enemy Combatants: A Centripetal Story,
43 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1 (2007), http://www.tilj.org/content/journal/43/numl/
Dannerl.pdf.
28 Getting Away with Torture: The Bush Administration and Mistreatment of De-
tainees, Human Rights Watch (July 12, 2011) https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/07/
12/getting-away-torture/bush-administration-and-mistreatment-detainees.
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tion centers not only resonate with the policies of the United States,
but also must be analyzed as a truly global problem in the interna-
tional community's response to terrorism. 29 If such actions are permit-
ted due to the notion that they exist in a "legal black hole" because the
torture, interrogations, and detentions are occur outside the technical
sovereignty of the state actors, it is a slippery slope for the legitimacy
associated with human rights law. In such a reality, the instituted pro-
tections associated with a persons' basic human rights quickly and ef-
ficiently devolves.
It is critical there be a shift in the literature to discuss how
extraterritorial state activities are considered under public interna-
tional law. The conversation concerning the mechanism for the protec-
tion of human rights has mainly been concerned with the relationship
between the state and its activities within its own territory, and the
obligation to uphold basic human rights within those set boundaries.
Yet, this has proven to not be comprehensive enough in the current
international community. The laws surrounding armed conflict arid
the multilateral treaties that have been created to set the parameters
for the rules of war were intended to handle conflicts between sover-
eign nations. Yet, terrorism and terrorist organizations operate in
multiple countries simultaneously, and it is inherently ambiguous in
nature. The emergence of extraterritorial state activities used to con-
trol and respond to the threat of terrorism insinuates that the current
discourse is not expansive enough, thus leaving individuals who be-
come subject to such "legal black holes" to become susceptible to hav-
ing their most basic rights openly violated.3 0
Therefore, although the discourse has suggested that because
Guantanamo Bay suffers from an assumed technicality in which it is
supposedly not under United States sovereignty and therefore exists
outside of the realm of legal consequences, public international and
human rights must be seen as expansive enough to cover extraterrito-
rial state activities to provide for the maintenance of basic human
rights. Further, the conversation must focus upon the fact that human
rights attaches to the person, and therefore the legal obligations set
out through the treaties must be used as an enforcement mechanism
to protect the legitimacy of human rights law.
29 Such can be seen by British soldiers mistreating Iraqi's, or Jordan and Morocco
instituting practices of detention and torture during interrogations similar to that
seen in Guantanamo, and the Australian detention centers, which use Guanta-
namo as a justification for their mechanisms.
30 Wilde, supra note 11, at 754.
2016]
80 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 15:1
II. HISTORY
In the months following the 9/11 attacks, Congress authorized
President Bush to begin implementing the use of missile and air
strikes against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. 1 Soon after, the
United States initiated a ground invasion as well, and by 2003 the war
on terror had extended beyond the territorial boundaries of Afghani-
stan, and expanded to include Iraq as well.3 2 The United States, in
conjunction with its allies, has since captured thousands of members of
both Al Qaeda and the Taliban throughout the war on terror.33 While
some were released or detained in the countries in which they were
captured 34 , more than 750 individuals have been designated as "un-
lawful enemy combatants" and sent to be detained at Guantanamo
Bay, a United States naval base in Cuba.35
Guantanamo Bay has been leased by the United States since
1903, following the conclusion of the Spanish-American War which es-
tablished the independent Republic of Cuba 36 , and serves as the oldest
American naval base outside of the continental United States.3 7 The
lease was then reaffirmed under a subsequent 1934 treaty, which fur-
ther provided the two methods under which the lease could be termi-
nated: if both Cuba and the United States agree to discontinue the
agreement, or if the United States completely abandons the prop-
erty.3" Therefore, the duration of the lease was not specified and in-
stead is seemingly perpetual in nature. Article III of the lease defines
the extent of the control with the United States can exercise over
Guantanamo Bay:
While on the one hand, the United States recognizes the
continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of
Cuba over the above described areas of land and water,
and on the other hand the Republic of Cuba consents
that during the period of the occupation by the United
States of said areas under the terms of this agreement,
the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and
control over and within said areas with the right to ac-
31 Hardy, supra note 1, at 151.
32 Crawford, supra note 6, at 57.
33 Hardy, supra note 1, at 151.
34 Hardy, supra note 1, at 151.
35 MARK P. DENBEAUX & JONATHAN HAFETZ, Introduction to THE GUANTANAMO
LAWYERS INSIDE A PRISON OUTSIDE THE LAW 1 (Mark P. Denbeaux et al. eds.,
2009).
36 Hardy, supra note 1, at 152.
37 Alfred De Zayas, The Status of Guant6namo Bay and the Status of the Detain-
ees, 37 U.B.C. L. REV. 277, 288 (2004).
38 See id. at 290.
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quire for the public purposes of the United States any
land or other property therein by purchase or by exercise
of eminent domain with full compensation to the owners
thereof.3
9
Despite the century-long presence, the detention facilities did
not open for their current purpose until 2001, following the American
intervention in Afghanistan4 ° and the first group of detainees' arrival
on January 11, 2002.41 Since 2002, Guantanamo Bay detention cen-
ters have been established as prisons with the primary purpose of de-
taining suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters who were captured
during the war on terror. The decision to utilize Guantanamo Bay as a
prison was strategic, and directly linked to its interesting and rela-
tively undefined legal status under both domestic and international
law. As a consequence of the terms underlying both the lease and the
subsequent treaty between Cuba and the United States, Guantanamo
Bay is considered to be under the full control of the United States, but
is significantly still subject to Cuban sovereignty. Therefore, Guanta-
namo Bay, and the 61 current detainees of the prison4 2 , are not enti-
tled to the same legal protections that are afforded to citizens or those
within the technical territorial bounds of the United States stemming
from the Constitution and legislation, which has sparked sharp legal
and political debates.
The debate focuses on how to categorize the detainees, and is
underlined by the shattered notion of traditional security threats
stemming from the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Typically, the international
regime and the law of armed conflict focused upon state initiated at-
tacks. With the introduction of non-state actors playing a significant
role in the national security discourse following 9/11, it was unclear
how international law would or could respond.
President Bush initially posited that these detainees would not
be covered under the Third Geneva Convention4 3 , which established
the rules surrounding the treatment of prisoners of war. This held sig-
nificant consequences for the enumeration of rights and privileges that
39 Agreement between Cuba and the United States for the Lease of Lands for Coal-
ing and Naval Stations, art. III, Feb. 16-Feb. 23,1903, 6 U.S.T.I.A 1113 (1968)
[hereinafter Lease].
40 Samantha Pearlman, Note, Human Rights Violations at Guantanamo Bay:
How the United States Has Avoided Enforcement of International Norms, 38 SEAT-
TLE U.L. REV. 1109, 1110 (2015).
41 Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyol, Globalized Citizenship: Sovereignty, Se-
curity, and Soul, 50 VILL L. REV. 1009, 1037 (2005).
42 GUANTANAMO BY THE NUMBERS, https://www.aclu.org/infographic/guantanamo-
numbers (last visited Sep. 16, 2016).
43 Andrew Cohen, The Torture Memos, 10 Years Later, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 6,
2012).
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the Guantanamo Bay detainees could expect from international and
human rights law. In 2002, President Bush then changed his position
and instead posited that only the Taliban regime would be covered
under the Third Geneva Convention, but not the Al Qaeda fighters.4 4
This argument was based on the fact that Afghanistan was a formal
signatory to the set of treaties, but Al Qaeda independently was not.4 5
Yet, the shift in President Bush's position held no material effect on
the rights, protections, or treatments afforded to the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay.
Instead, the most significant denial of rights and privileges
stemmed from the administration's categorization of the detainees as
"unlawful enemy combatants" rather than prisoners of war. To catego-
rize the Taliban and Al Qaeda as prisoners of war would have forced
the United States to afford to the detainees a certain number of pro-
tected substantive and procedural rights, as required under the Third
Geneva Convention as well as other numerous human rights treaties
to which the United States is a party.4 6 Instead, the detainees were
deemed to be "unlawful enemy combatants."47 As the detaining au-
thority ultimately decides the status of the prisoners, the failure to
grant the detainees the prisoner of war status has both allowed the
United States to not afford the detainees significant legal, or even ba-
sic human rights, and has opened the country up to significant criti-
cisms from the international community.4 S
In defense of this position, the United States argued that the
Taliban and Al Qaeda militants do not qualify as 'prisoners of war'
under Article 4 of the Geneva Conventions, which comes with a set of
legally afforded protections. 4 9 As a consequence, the United States
therefore did not have to afford the prisoners such rights as health-
care, or follow a set of standards in their interrogation and detention
methods, as would be required if the detainees were labeled as prison-
ers of war.50
44 John Mintz & Mike Allen, Bush Shifts Position on Detainees, WASH. POST, (Feb.
8, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.comarchive/politics/2002/02/08/bush-shifts-
position-on-detainees/ae3e49c6-OdbO-4b5b-a646-afb34cldd0fl/.
45 Id.
46 See Kelly Wallace & Andrea Koppel, Bush advisers debate detainees status,
CNN, (Jan. 26, 2002), http://edition.cnn.com2002/US/01/26/ret.powell.detainees/
index.html.
47 See id.
48 See Jerica M. Morris-Frazier, Missing In Action: Prisoners of War At Guanta-
namo Bay, 13 D.C. L. REV. 155, 160, 176 (2010).
49 CCR, Report on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment of Pris-
oners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 13-14 (July, 2006), http://ccrjustice.org/sites/de
faultlfiles/assets/ReportReportOnTorture.pdf.
50 Morris-Frazier, supra note 48, at 160.
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The debate over what exactly to do with Guantanamo has
shifted from the Bush Administration, into a central theme of the dis-
course under the Obama Administration.51 Within his presidential
campaign, then Senator Obama pledged to close the detention centers
at Guantanamo Bay, and to ensure that the United States upheld its
obligations under the Geneva Conventions. 2 Yet, it is nine years later,
and the facility still continues to operate. Despite the promises of the
presidential hopeful in 2007, Congress has since made it difficult for
President Obama to fulfill his vow to close the detention center. Con-
gress has instigated strict procedures for the repatriation of detainees
to countries that they have determined to have a vulnerable security
environment.53 Inside the detention centers, reprehensible conditions
have been exposed as prisoners have come forward with the details of
their abuse54 . Detainees have also engaged in protests.55 Despite the
efforts and attempts of President Obama to improve and close the de-
tention centers at Guantanamo Bay, fifteen years after it opened for
its current purpose, both the status of the facilities and the detainees
are still caught in a state of uncertainty and those that complied with
and instigated the torture are still shrouded in the protections of this
fake immunity.
III. HuMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Due to the malleable legal status of both the detention centers
and the detainees, there is a great risk for human rights violations,
which in the case of Guantanamo Bay have been admitted to exist.
56
This section will detail the myriad human rights violations that have
occurred at the detention centers. The type of treatment described in
this section further reiterates the need for human rights to be under-
stood as belonging purely to the individual, regardless of location or
superficial status.
51 See Senator Barack Obama, Speech at Woodrow Wilson International Center
(Aug. 1, 2007), http://www.cfr.org/elections/obamas-speech-woodrow-wilson-
center/p13974.
52 See id.
53 See David Nakamura, Obama Administration to Transfer Two Guantanamo
Bay Detainees, WASH. POST (July 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/obama-administration-to-transfer-two-guantanamo-bay-
detainees/2013/07/26/86a67la6-f62b-1le2-aa2e-4088616498b4_story.html.
54 Human Rights Watch, infra note 58 at 30.
55 Both in 2005 and in 2013, detainees have staged a mass hunger strike in pro-
test of the worsening conditions. As a result, the military ultimately force-fed the
detainees. See Hunger Strike at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2013).
56 William J. Aceves, United States v. George Tenet: A Federal Indictment for Tor-
ture, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 34 (2015).
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The United States has argued that the techniques used on the
detainees and the activities at Guantanamo Bay are justifiable due to
the possibility that the extraterritorial nature of the detention centers
precludes the applicability of human rights law.5 7 While the primary
responsibility for the respecting, protection, and proliferation of such
rights are dependent upon states, the rights are individual in nature."5
Regardless of where an individual may be, or their status under the
law of armed conflict, the ban on torture has become so valued within
the international community that it cannot be derogated from.59 The
United States in its present activities at Guantanamo has ultimately
ignored this requirement. °
Following the end of World War II, the prohibition against tor-
ture as well as the solidification of the notion of a standard of human
rights became universally accepted, and serves as a pillar in interna-
tional law. It first appeared in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in 1948 and signaled the need "to eliminate the medieval meth-
ods of torture and cruel punishment which were practiced in the recent
past by the Nazis and fascists."6 1 Article 1 of the Declaration stated
that 'All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights',
and further Article 5 of the Declaration stated that 'No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.' 2
Significantly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights iden-
tifies rights that belong to every human being and protects every
human being from any violation of these rights. 63 As Eleanor
Roosevelt, a key drafter of the Declaration, stated, "human rights exist
to the degree that they are respected by people in relations with each
other and by governments in relations with their citizens."6 4 The Dec-
laration has served as the keystone for the human rights instruments
that followed, and each echoed the notion that human rights must be
understood as belonging to the individual alone and cannot depend on
57 Amnesty Int'l Report 2015/2016, The State of the World's Human Rights, Am-
nesty Int'l, 1, 388 (2016) https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/united-
states-of-america/report-united-states-of-america/.
58 Torture in Int'l Law: A Guide to Jurisprudence, CEJIL & APT, 2 (2008) http://
www.apt.ch/contentlfiles-res/jurisprudenceguide.pdf.
59 Id.
60 Torture and Prison Abuse, Global Policy Forum (2005) https://www.
globalpolicy.org/us-un-and-international-law-8-24/torture-and-prison-abuse.html.
61 Nigel Rodley & Matt Pollard, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 18 (3d ed. 2009).
62 Id.
63 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A /
RES/ 217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
64 See Eleanor Roosevelt Address, supra note 19.
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the location or status of the individual. If the United States continues
to disrespect the fact that human rights exist independent of any other
circumstance, the legitimacy of human rights law, as it was codified in
the Declaration, will dissolve. Despite the fact that the United States
is a party to several key binding instruments which have established
set human rights obligations and should have enforced the responsibil-
ity to protect such rights, there have been a myriad of reports which
detail the torture that has occurred at Guantanamo Bay at the hands
of American forces.
Several weeks following the initial invasion into Afghanistan,
the United Nations' Working Group on Arbitrary Detention called for
the Bush Administrated to allow for inspection of the centers, provide
information about the interrogation techniques, and to ensure that
prisoners would be afforded a fair trial.6 5 Although it was clear that
the prisoners were being held indefinitely, without trial, without hav-
ing been officially charged or their guilt declared, the Bush Adminis-
tration did not respond to the United Nations' Working Group's
request.66 Instead, information was slowly leaked to the public over
the course of the war, which made it explicitly clear that the detainees
were being subjected to torture and abuse, and their basic human
rights were being violated.
In 2002, photos were released that depicted the detainees as
"hooded, goggled, and shackled men in bright orange jumpsuits kneel-
ing before a wire mesh fence, their postures a grotesque parody of com-
mon Muslim prayer positions."67 In 2003, the International Committee
of the Red Cross presented more than 200 reported accounts of abuse
to the United States government.68 As detainees have been released
from the prison, they have publicly commented on the abuse and tor-
ture.69 Further, several detainees have died as a result of the interro-
65 Diane Marie Amann, Guantdnamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 321
(2004).
66 See id.
67 Report on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment of Prisoners
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, supra note 49, at 3.
68 Human Rights Watch, The Road to Abu Ghraib 1, 30 (2004), http://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa06O4.pdf.
69 Id.
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gation techniques.7 ° Four detainees committed suicide in 2007, and
attempted suicides were all but rare at Guantanamo. 7 1
In 2014, the interrogation methods detailed in the Committee
Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interroga-
tion Program,7 2 commonly known as the Torture Report, exemplified
the harsh conditions and torture to which the CIA subjected detainees.
Such examples of the torture and abuse the detainees experienced in-
cluded: (1) mock executions; (2) slaps and "wallings"7 3 ; (3) sleep depri-
vation7 4 ; (4) nudity 75 ; (5) waterboarding7 6 ; (6) sleep deprivation7 7 ; (7)
'rectal rehydration' or rectal feeding7 8 ; (8) placing detainees in ice
water "baths"7 9 ; (9) threatening detainees that "they would never be
allowed to leave CIA custody alive," or "suggesting to one detainee that
he would only leave in a coffin-shaped box"S°; (10) threatening detain-
ees with harm to their families.8' Further, throughout the actual in-
terrogations, the CIA consistently listed the interrogation as a higher
priority than the detainee's medical needs. s2
70 See Duncan Campbell & Suzanne Goldenberg, They Said This is America... If
a Soldier Orders You to Take Off Your Clothes, You Must Obey, GuARIA3N, (June
22, 2004), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jun/23/usa.afghanistan; Jean-
nine Bell, "Behind This Mortal Bone". The (In)Effectiveness of Torture, 83 IND. L.J.
339, 347 (2008), http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vo183/issl/8.
71 Brian Foley, Criminal Law: Guantanamo and Beyond: Dangers of Rigging the
Rules, 97 CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1009, 1054 (2007); Peter Jan Honigsberg, Inside
Guantanamo, 10 NEV. L.J. 82, 96 (2010).
72 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 112TH CONG., REP. ON. CENT. INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY'S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM 3-4, (Comm. Print
2012).
73 Id. (describing "wallings" as "slamming detainees against a wall").
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. (describing how waterboarding would become physically harmful, and would
cause convulsions, vomiting, one detainee to "become completely unresponsive,
with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth," and further explained as a "se-
ries of near drownings").
77 Id. (describing the technique as forcing detainees to remain awake "for up to
180 hours, usually standing or in stress positions with their hands shackled above
their heads," which caused at least five of the detainees to hallucinate).
78 Eric Bradner, CIA report's most shocking passages, CNN (Dec. 10, 2014), http://
www.cnn.com/2014/12/09/politics/cia-reports-shocking-passages/.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 4. (including threatening "harm the children of a detainee, threats to sex-
ually abuse the mother of a detainee, and a threat to 'cut [a detainee's] mother's
throat).
82 Id. at 3. (describing how the CIA continued "its enhanced interrogation tech-
niques despite warnings from CIA medical personnel that the techniques could
exacerbate physical injuries," and how in at least one case, "the CIA instructed
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In addition, the Torture Report outlines the poor conditions at
the detention centers-the chief of interrogations went so far as to de-
scribe the center as a "dungeon." 3 The Report details how detainees
were subject to being "kept in complete darkness and constantly
shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to
use for human waste." 4 The combination of the inhumane interroga-
tion tactics and substandard facilities caused numerous detainees to
demonstrate a myriad of different psychological and behavior issues,
such as hallucinations, paranoia, insomnia, and attempted self-harm
and mutilation. 5
The numerous reports of torture and abuse that have occurred
at the Guantanamo Bay detention centers have reiterated the need for
the discourse surrounding the extraterritorial application of state ac-
tivities to analyze how, and in what context, the detainees and the
facility itself should be categorized. Throughout the war on terror, the
United States has faced criticism concerning the accusations of torture
inflicted upon the detainees. Nevertheless, the international commu-
nity has not been able to adequately enforce the prohibitions against
torture to protect the detainee's rights, which has created grave conse-
quences for both the detainees and the continued legitimacy of human
rights law. Despite the seemingly "legal black hole" under which
Guantanamo Bay exists, international treaties do cover the activities
that occur at the detention centers, and must be enforced to maintain
the legitimacy surrounding the recognition and protection of human
rights.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
AND THE "LEGAL BLACK HOLE"
In response to the global war on terror, the current discourse
has debated whether it is possible to combat an inherently ambiguous
and amorphous concept such as terrorism under the established laws
of war. Following the initial 9/11 attacks, a White House memoran-
dum from early 2002 highlighted this debate by postulating that the
war on terror "required new thinking in the law of war. 8s 6 Yet, in 2001,
at the time of the initiation of the global war on terror, the United
personnel that the interrogation [sic] would take "precedence" over his medical
care").
83 Id. at 4.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President, The Sec'y
of State, The Sec'y of Def.,The Att'y. Gen., & Other Officials 2 (Feb. 7, 2002), http:ll
www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/docume nts/20020207-2.pdf [herein-
after Bush Memo].
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States was a signatory, and therefore bound to, a number of interna-
tional legal instruments dictate the standards for treatment and pro-
tection of all parties involved in a conflict. These international legal
instruments have triggered a series of duties which the United States
must abide by in terms of the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo
Bay, and include: 1) The Geneva Convention; 2) The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and; 3) the Convention Against
Torture.
Because the United States has signed and ratified these trea-
ties, the United States is obliged to uphold basic human rights. In re-
sponse, the Bush Administration argued that derogation from such
treaties was acceptable under domestic law in the interest of national
security concerns.8 7 A treaty acts as a binding contract which estab-
lishes the rights and obligations of the contracting parties. 8 The war
on terrorism was used as a scapegoat by many lawyers in the Bush
Administration to undermine the well-established rules of interna-
tional law and to justify the derogation from the treaty-created obliga-
tions. Initially following the attacks, the senior legal advisors to the
President argued that because the United States was experiencing an
unparalleled clear and present danger, international law was irrele-
vant, as it must allow for states to prioritize national security over all
else. The argument relied on the idea that all necessary means to pre-
serve national security could be instituted into the war on terrorism,
thereby implicitly allowing the torture that occurred at Guantanamo
Bay.8 9 Yet, international law is clear in that torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is prohibited. Such a
bar has been explicitly stated and reiterated in the Geneva Conven-
tions, ICCPR, and the CAT.9 °
In addition, the arguments promulgated by the Bush Adminis-
tration fail because human rights cannot be suspended based upon an
individual's territorial location or status at a certain place in time.9 1
Instead, human rights are naturally afforded to the individual, and
87 Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 112 (2004).
88 Sean Murphy, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (2nd ed. 2012).
89 Peter J. Honigsberg, Chasing "Enemy Combatants" and Circumventing Interna-
tional Law: A License for Sanctioned Abuse, 12 UCLA J. INT'L. L. & FOR. AFF. 1, 8
(2007).
90 Id. at 11; See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [herein-
after CAT]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
III]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].91 Geneva Convention III, supra note 17.
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cannot be stripped away through the use of seemingly extraterritorial
and legally ambiguous circumstances.9 2 Despite the fact that the
United States government argues that these international obligations
cannot be applied to the detention centers or the detainees at Guanta-
namo Bay as it does not technically fall under American sovereignty,
the rights which each proliferates belongs to the individuals them-
selves, regardless of their placement. Therefore, the argument that
Guantanamo Bay and the detainees exist in a "legal black hole" is in-
herently fruitless, and must be understood as illegitimate to preserve
human rights.
A. Geneva Convention
The Geneva Conventions are a series of four treaties and two
additional protocols which establish a series of standard rules for
states to follow in terms of the treatment of civilians, soldiers who
have been rendered hors de combat, and combatants during periods of
war and armed conflict." Significantly, the Third Geneva Convention
governs the status and rights to be afforded to prisoners of war
(POWs) and detainees. Under Article 4 of the Convention, protections
associated with POW status are granted to members of a regular
armed force, and other individuals such as militias and volunteer
corps that serve as a part of the regular militia.9 4 Further, even if a
party is not a member of the regular armed forces but instead is part of
a separate militia, volunteer corps, or an organized resistance move-
ment that is not affiliated with the regular armed services, they too
are to be granted the protections associated with POW status. 9 5 Such
status and protections will only be afforded if (a) the organization has
a hierarchical command structure, (b) displays a unique and distinc-
tive sign that is recognizable at a distance, (c) carries arms openly, and
(d) follows the prescribed laws of war.96 Further, individuals who re-
side in the invaded territory, and took up arms against the invading
force, shall be granted prisoner of war status.
9 7
When the first detainees arrived at Guantanamo Bay, it was
unclear which laws would regulate the detention or treatment of de-
tainees, as their status as prisoners of war had yet to be determined.
By 2002, the position of the United States and Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld was that, "...technically unlawful combatants do
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. art. 4(A)(6).
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not have any rights under the Geneva Conventions."" s The term "un-
lawful combatants," rather than "prisoner of war" was bestowed upon
the detainees because it was argued that the detainees did not wear
identifiable uniforms, observe a hierarchical command structure, or
follow the rules of war.9 9 Yet this was strategically done to deny the
detainees the well-established privileges, protections, and rights guar-
anteed under international law to prisoners of war. While the tradi-
tional laws of war encompass state engaged wars, Al Qaeda was not
involved in any one particular state, but rather was an amorphous
transnational organization. The United States then reiterated that the
Taliban would not be covered by the Geneva Conventions, as they did
not follow the traditional laws of war.1 00 Yet, the attempt by the
United States to classify the detainees under a new name as an "un-
lawful enemy combatant" does not eliminate the rights of a prisoner of
war.
Domestically, the Bush Administration attempted to justify the
detention through the introduction of the term "unlawful enemy com-
batants." °1 While American law typically precludes detention without
a criminal trial,1 0 2 the use of the term "unlawful enemy combatant"
allowed for the Bush Administration to argue that at least under do-
mestic law, the detentions were lawful.1 °3 The United States has in-
sinuated that this "unlawful enemy combatant" status is a new
phenomenon in international law, and therefore the detainees them-
selves seemingly exist in their own "legal black hole." As senior legal
advisor to the State Department, John Bellinger stipulated the Ge-
neva Conventions "were designed in 1949 for different sorts of circum-
stances, and they don't provide easy answers in all cases to how to deal
with international terrorists."'0 4 Yet, this position is too narrow and
does not allow for the Geneva Conventions to provide the individual
protections that underline the Conventions original creation.
98 Monica Whitlock, Legal Limbo of Guantanamo's Prisoners, BBC NEWS (May 16,
2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3034697.stm.
99 See Bush Memo, supra note 86.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987) (stating that "a general rule
of substantive due process [is] that the government may not detain a person prior
to a judgment of guilt a criminal trial").
103 In this way, the detainees at Guantanamo were likened to the thousands of
German and Italian prisoners of war that the United States detained during
World War II, without any significant contention. See generally In re Territo, 156
F.2d 142, 145-46 (9th Cir. 1946).
104 The Legal Basis of U.S. Detention Policies, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (2016),
http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/enemy-detentionldetention-policy.
LEGAL STATUS OF GUANTANAMO BAY
In 2006, the Bush Administration defined an 'unlawful enemy
combatant' as:
A person who has engaged in hostilities or who has pur-
posefully and materially supported hostilities against
the US or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy
combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban,
A1-Qaeda, or associated forces); or a person who, before,
on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an
unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Re-
view Tribunal or another competent tribunal established
under the authority of the President or the Secretary of
Defense. 10
5
By creating such a definition, the administration attempted to circum-
vent the protections that should and would have been afforded to the
detainees had they been granted prisoner of war status under the Ge-
neva Conventions. Instead, the administration sought to create a new
class which it argued held an indeterminate legal status and therefore
protections could be withheld. But the definition still applies to an in-
dividual, and an individual alone, as do the protections afforded by the
Geneva Convention. Despite the attempt by the administration to
cloak the detainees in a new sort of legally ambiguous nature, the Con-
vention and its protections attach to individuals, regardless of their
location and therefore could not be withheld, even with this new
definition.
Instead, the Third Geneva Convention defined prisoners of war
as:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps
forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of
other volunteer corps, including those of organized resis-
tance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict
and operating in or outside of their own territory, even if
this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or
volunteer corps, including such organized movements,
fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person respon-
sible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recog-
nizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
105 Military Commissions Act § 43, 10 U.S.C. § 948 (2006).
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(d) that of conducting their operations in accor-
dance with the laws and customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess
allegiance to a government or an authority not recog-
nized by the Detaining Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces
without actually being members thereof, such as civilian
members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents,
supply contractors, members of labour units or of ser-
vices responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, pro-
vided that they have received authorization, from the
armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide
them for that purpose with an identity card similar to
the annexed model.
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots,
and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews
of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not
benefit by more favorable treatment under any other
provisions of international law.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who
on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up
arms to resist the invading forces, without having had
time to form themselves into regular armed units, pro-
vided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and
customs of war.10
6
And further, it includes civilians who are captured along with
the combatants, but are not considered to be members of the organiza-
tion and individuals who reside in the invaded territory and took up
arms against the invading force.
10 7
The United States has tried to argue that due to the fact that
members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces reputedly failed part of
the four-prong test, under Article 4(2), that they do not qualify as pris-
oners of war. Yet, even without meeting all four requirements, the de-
tainees would still qualify under the prisoner of war status as
"inhabitants of a non-occupied territory who, on the approach of the
enemy, spontaneously take up arm to resist the invading forces." l0 8
Based on this definition, American, Al Qaeda and Taliban forces are
still guaranteed the protections associated with prisoner of war status.
While terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon in the global
arena, and it may be difficult to group all the detainees under one um-
brella definition, the Geneva Conventions can be seen as encompass-
106 Geneva Convention III, supra note 17, art. 4(A).
107 Id.
108 Id.
LEGAL STATUS OF GUANTANAMO BAY
ing the ambiguity and providing a solution to these unchartered laws
of war. Geneva Convention III Article 5 holds that:
The present Convention shall apply to the person re-
ferred to in article 4 from the time they fall into the
power of the enemy and until their final release and re-
patriation. Should any doubt arise as to whether per-
sons, having committed a belligerent act and having
falling into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the
categories enumerated in article 4, such persons shall
enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such
time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal. 109
Article 5 explicitly calls for all persons to be granted the protec-
tions associated with prisoner of war status, even if there is doubt.1 10
Therefore, the argument that "unlawful enemy combatant" is a new
phenomenon, inherently fails. Despite the fact that Article 5 does not
define what constitutes doubt,1 1 1 there is a presumption that detain-
ees will qualify as prisoners of war until proven otherwise. Even with
the creation of a thinly veiled new definition, Article 5 allows for the
ambiguity associated with what sorts of protections should be afforded
to terrorists to be encompassed by the Conventions.1 1 2
The United States argued that because there was not an Arti-
cle 5 question of doubt, there was therefore no need for a fact finding
tribunal - Al Qaeda did not qualify for the Geneva protections, so
neither could the individual detainees.11 3 In terms of the Taliban, the
denial of prisoner of war status rights was justified on the basis that
the President had the ability to decide the status of the detainees, ab-
sent a determination from a competent and neutral tribunal.1 1 4 Al-
though this position has been reiterated throughout the international
community, the United States remains an outlier in this respect as it
consistently questions the extraterritorial application of human rights
treaties. Internationally, there is a strong consensus that human
109 Id. art. 5.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Major Dana M. Hollywood, Redemption Deferred: Military Commissions in the
War on Terror and the Charge of Providing Material Support for Terrorism, 36
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 48 (2013).
114 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Just., to
Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, Gen. Couns.
of the Dep't of Def., (Jan. 22, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/sites/defaultfiles/olc/
legacy/2009/08/24/memo-laws-taliban-detainees.pdf.
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rights treaties do apply if the government exercises control and juris-
diction over the territory. 115 Notably, it has been argued that:
Every person in enemy hands must have some status
under international law: he is either a prisoner of war
and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a civilian
covered by the Fourth Convention, or a medical profes-
sional of the military who is covered by the First Conven-
tion, but there is no intermediate status; nobody in
enemy hands can be outside the law. Twisting the labels
"belligerent" and "combatant" with adjectives cannot
evade the laws of war because all categories have
rights. .. 116
The argument demonstrates the fact that international law and the
rights associated with the regime attach to the person and cannot be
dissolved based on a new situation, definition, or the use of an extra-
territorial detention center. The limited legal loophole found by the
United States reiterates the need for the international community to
adapt the current standards of war to the changing regime.
Despite the shattering introduction of non-state actors and ter-
rorism into the global mindset, the protection of human rights cannot
be derogated from or ignored, as has been the case with the United
States in Guantanamo Bay. It is clear that despite the clever attempt
to mask prisoners of war under a new "unlawful enemy combatant"
title, the United States continues to violate the obligations set out
under the Geneva Convention. It is important to note that the defini-
tion and the Convention, as explicitly stated throughout the treaty's
articles, apply to the person, and the person alone regardless of their
locality.1 17 This notion is consistently seen in the language of the Ge-
neva Convention- the individual rights must be understood as at-
taching to the person regardless of their locality and they cannot be
diminished just because they are being held outside of United States'
technical sovereignty or because they're cloaked in an arguably new
class of "unlawful enemy combatants."1 i 8
115 Recently, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and Canada have upheld
this position, and numerous international bodies have echoed the same belief. See
Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human
Rights, (5th rev. ed. 2002), https://www.cidh.org/terrorisn/eng/toc/htm; see also
Oona A. Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human Rights Treaty
Obligations Apply Extraterritorially?, 43 ARiz. ST. L. J. 389, 390-405 (2011).
116 International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary, Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1958), https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?documentld=18E3CCDE8BE7E
2F8C 12563CD0042A50B&action=openDocument.
117 See generally Geneva Convention III, supra note 17.
118 Id.
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B. International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights
Ratified by the United States in 1992, the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights attempts to ensure that states pro-
tect the right to life, peaceful assembly, and basic human rights such
as the freedom from torture, slavery, and retroactive criminal legisla-
tion.119 Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Covenant articulates that "each
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to en-
sure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of
any kind.
120
Significantly, the treaty again explicitly states that the Cove-
nant is bound to protect the rights of individuals based on their status
as a human being, and by a state signing into these obligations, it con-
tracts to protect the individual's rights.121 The ICCPR limits itself by
only binding states to protect individual's rights as they fall within the
state's jurisdiction or territorial sovereignty.1 22 As the detainees are
held outside of technical American sovereignty, it is then necessary to
determine whether or not the detainees at Guantanamo can be
deemed as falling under the jurisdiction of the United States.
The relevant case law establishes that state actors can and will
be held responsible for violations of human rights, even if the activities
occur under the jurisdiction or sovereignty of another state.1 23 The
United Nations Human Rights Committee - an agency created to su-
pervise state compliance with the treaty - has explicitly declared that
the ICCPR is intended to apply to any area within a state party's juris-
diction and control. 124 The Committee, in its March 2004 General
Comment No. 31, explained the scope of the Covenant by stating that a
"State Party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Cove-
nant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State
Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party"
25
119 See generally ICCPR, supra note 17.
120 Id. art. 2.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 The Human Rights Committee has explicitly stated that Article 2(1) of the
ICCPR "does not imply that the state party concerned cannot be held accountable
for violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit upon the terri-
tory of another state." Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 52/1979 (29
July 1981), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985) 88, 91, 12.3.
124 See ICCPR, supra note 17 art. 2. (stipulating that each state party must "en-
sure to all individuals... subject to it's jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind").
125 UN Hum. Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31 on Art. 2 of the Covenant:
The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Cove-
nant, 10 UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
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This statement establishes a clear standard for the scope of the juris-
diction of the Covenant, and thereby asserts that jurisdiction is based
solely upon the individual, regardless of the person's current location.
Specifically, the Committee establishes that the jurisdictional stan-
dard is met when a person ("anyone") has a relationship with the State
in which the State exercises "power or effective control."1 2 6
This was again reiterated in 2011, 2014, and 2015 by the
Human Rights Committee, and can be summed up in the Committee's
Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report on the United
States of America:
"The Committee regrets that the State party continues to
maintain the position that the Covenant does not apply
with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction, but
outside its territory, despite the interpretation to the
country of article 2, paragraph 1, supported by the Com-
mittee's established jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of
the International Court of Justice and State practice."1 2 7
Significantly, the Committee that is charged with determining
the applicability of the treaty specifically noted that the treaty and
thus the associated protections apply to the individuals without any
other prerequisites besides jurisdiction. The United States signed and
ratified the treaty without including a specific reservation that would
have excluded Guantanamo from the covenant's jurisdiction. 12 ' As the
United States exercises complete jurisdiction and control over Guanta-
namo by virtue of the lease and subsequent treaty with Cuba,, and
further is a party to the ICCPR, it is clear that the detainees at Guan-
tanamo are therefore fully entitled, without exception, to the protec-
tions the Covenant provides. This is due to the fact that rights attach
individually and cannot be dissolved based on a thinly veiled argu-
ment of jurisdiction 129 . Guantanamo exists under American control,
and this, coupled with the fact that human rights are triggered solely
by an individual's status as a human being, means that the United
States is in violation of its ICCPR duties. Further, it is important to
note that the ICCPR applies during both peace times and periods of
armed conflict 130 . Therefore, the ICCPR applies to the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, and the protections granted by the treaty must be
provided to the detainees.
126 Wilde, supra note 11, at 804.
127 UN Hum. Rights Comm., Concluding observations on the fourth periodic re-
port of the United States of America, 10 UN Doc. CCPRIC/USA/CO/4 (April 23,
2014).
128 Pearlman, supra note 40, at 1118; De Zayas, supra note 37, at 310.
129 ICCPR, supra note 17, art 2.
130 Id.
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C. Convention Against Torture
As stated previously, torture and other cruel treatment had
been internationally condemned following the end of World War II.
The 1984 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) codified the general duties
and instead established detailed parameters that were originally set
out in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and then reit-
erated throughout numerous other treaties."' The CAT specifically
prohibits the use of torture, or "other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment" '132 within the party's territories. 33
Article 1 then broadly outlines the prohibition by defining tor-
ture as:
any act which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instiga-
tion of a public official on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.' 34
The Convention explicitly states that there is no acceptable
derogation from the prohibition on torture as it declares that under "no
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emer-
gency, may be invoked as a justification for torture."13 Such a strict
level of responsibility attached to the ban on torture demonstrates the
importance of the ban, and therefore the significance of the American
argument for the limited scope of the treaty to apply extraterritorial-
ity. The CAT is clear that no circumstances can eliminate the responsi-
bility to not torture another individual, which demonstrates that the
United States' view that the seemingly extraterritorial nature of
Guantanamo puts the prohibition on hold is invalid. For the prohibi-
tion to be truly effective in preventing the use of torture, it must be
seen as being triggered purely by the individual's status as a human
being. While it is undeniable that the United States can only uphold
131 CAT, supra note 17.
132 Id. art. 16.
133 Id. art. 5.
134 Id. art 1.
135 Id. art 2.
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the protections of the treaty in areas of which it has control, the right
to not be subject to torture is not based upon that same area. Instead,
this right is based upon the individual being a human being and to
insinuate that there is a geographic gap in that status dissolves the
entire purpose of human rights law.
Further, pursuant to Article 2, all states must enact effective
legislative, administrative, and judicial measures in order to prevent
torture within any territory under the party's jurisdiction.1 3 6 Under
Article 5, a state party is considered to have jurisdiction over an act of
torture in four situations: "(a) when the offenses are committed in any
territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered
in that State; (b) when the alleged offender is a national of that State;
(c) when the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it
appropriate; or (d) when the alleged guilty party is within any terri-
tory that falls under the jurisdiction of the state, and the state does not
extradite the individual."13 7 As stated within the initial lease as well
as the subsequent treaty that established the United States right to
occupy Guantanamo Bay, the detention centers fall under American
control and jurisdiction. 3 '
The United States has implemented a reservation to the treaty
by stating that Article 16 only applies to the extent that the conduct is
prohibited under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of
the United States Constitution.1 39 Notably, however, none of these
amendments ban torture. The international community has accepted
that there are no geographic gaps in terms of the bar on torture, and
the prohibition applies to all individuals irrespective of their status as
a possible alleged terrorist or state enemy, or the individual's loca-
tion. 140 Still, the United States continues to argue that the extraterri-
torial nature of Guantanamo precludes the ability of the protections to
apply. Yet, the international community has accepted the absolute na-
ture of the bar on torture due to the fact that the protections apply to
the individual regardless of any jurisdictional or territorial perqui-
sites. The discourse has sought to ensure that every person, regardless
of their criminal, terrorist, civilian, lawful or unlawful combatant sta-
tus may not be tortured or subject to any other cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment based solely on the person being a human being.
Although the United States government has attempted to ar-
gue that the ban is inapplicable at Guantanamo due to the seemingly
extraterritorial nature of the detention centers, the rights are not pre-
136 Id.
137 Id. art 5.
138 See Lease, supra note 39.
139 See generally CAT, supra note 17.
140 Id.
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mised upon American sovereignty over the base. Instead, the rights
exist independently as they attach to the individual, and such rights
cannot be suspended based on an individual's location. To do so would
diminish the legitimacy of human rights, and would hold severe conse-
quences for the enforcement of human rights law. Such points were
reiterated by the Committee Against Torture in 2006, when it stated
that the United States "should rescind any interrogation technique,
including methods involving sexual humiliation, 'water boarding,'
'short shackling', and using dogs to induce fear, that constitute torture,
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, in all places of
detention under its de facto effective control, in order to comply with
its obligations under the Convention." '1 4 1 The need for the United
States to reevaluate its policies stems from the fact that the Conven-
tion and the ban on torture is inherent in every individual, regardless
of their location. The government thinly veils this requirement by ar-
guing that their effective control without the underpinnings of sover-
eignty does not require the same level of protections to be afforded to
the detainees. But this position ignores the individual nature of the
rights and therefore is in violation of the Convention.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, despite the seemingly "legal black hole" under
which Guantanamo Bay exists, it is clear that international law does
cover the detention facilities and the detainees. Therefore, the United
States has consistently violated, and continues to do so, the obligations
and duties to which it is contractually bound under The Geneva Con-
vention, ICCPR, and the CAT. In order to ensure the continued legiti-
macy of human rights law, it must be understood and reiterated that
rights attach based on personhood alone. In addition, treaty obliga-
tions that solidify such rights must be used as enforcement mecha-
nisms. Despite President Obama's recent and substantial efforts to
officially close the facilities,14 2 the need for the current discourse sur-
rounding state activities and their extraterritorial application is still
incredibility relevant. As officials in Egypt, Zimbabwe, Russia, Iran
and China have pointed to Guantanamo Bay in defense of their own
human rights violations,1 4 3 the need for the absolute association of the
rights as individual becomes especially pertinent and necessary.
The age of terrorism and non-state actors as a significant and
impending threat upon the global community and regime is upon us,
141 Rep. of the Comm. Against Torture, CAT/A/61/44 (May 19, 2006).
142 Gregory Korte & Tom Vanden Brook, Obama takes last chance to close Guanta-
namo Bay, USA TODAY (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/poli
tics/2016/02/23/obama-releases-plan-close-guantanamo-bay/80792250/.
143 Yoo & Cox, supra note 21, at 14.
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and has not lessened since the inception and operation of Guantanamo
Bay. On Christmas Day in 2009, a Nigerian Islamist whom Al Qaeda
had trained, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, attempted to blow up an
American airplane bound for Detroit by concealing explosives hidden
in his underwear.' 4 4 Further, in May of 2010, Faisal Shahzad, a Pakis-
tani born American citizen attempted to bomb Times Square. 14 5 Brit-
ish soldiers have been accused of abuse and torture of Iraqi
prisoners, 14 6 including allegations of beating a prisoner to death, beat-
ing a prisoner and forcing him to swim across a river where the pris-
oner subsequently drowned, and shooting civilians.' 4 7 London, Paris,
and Brussels have recently been the target of terrorist plots. 14 s As a
result of the obvious limbo under which this aspect of law and order
exists in the age of terrorism, the public international law sphere
needs to set substantial parameters as to how countries can respond to
such threats.
The legal "black hole" surrounding Guantanamo Bay leaves
uncertainty for other signatories to such treaties and strips the en-
forcement mechanisms associated with the protection of the detainees
of their teeth. In addition, the argument ignores the fact that human
rights are individual in nature, and cannot be suspended or dissolved
based upon a person's location or arguable status. To do so would de-
volve the legitimacy and underlying purpose of human rights law as a
whole, and would have severe consequences for the established order
in the international community. Further, the legally ambiguous na-
ture of the extraterritorial state activities creates a set of twin risks for
state actors, which should serve as an incentive for the actors involved
144 David Ariosto & Deborah Feyerick, Christmas Day bomber sentenced to life in
prison, CNN (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/16/justice/michigan-un
derwear-bomber-sentencing/.
145 Times Square Bomber Sentenced to Life in Prison, Fox NEWS (Oct. 5, 2010),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/10/05/times-square-bomber-faces-sentencing-nyc
.html.
146 Andrew Williams, British Soldiers Accused of Torture and Abuse During Iraq
Occupation, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.newsweek.comI2014/12/26/
british-soldiers-caught-further-torture-allegatinsduringiraqi-occupation-29232
3.html.
147 Id.; Richard Norton-Taylor & Steven Morris, Court Battle Over Iraqi Deaths,
THE GUARDIAN (May 5, 2004), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/may/05/
politicsandthemedia.iraqandthemedia.
148 7 July London bombings: What happened that day?, BBC NEWS (July 3, 2015),
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night?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/World-europe-3481
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in the public international and human rights law to want to close the
gap.
First, states may underestimate the obligations of the treaties,
which may lead to unintentional but significant human rights viola-
tions. On the other hand, if a state overestimates the obligations, it is
entirely possible that the state may not employ strategically necessary
tactics that may lead to serious national security concerns. This cre-
ates a huge potential for violations to occur, and if it is allowed to con-
tinue, human rights law as a whole will devolve and lose the
legitimacy it has worked so hard to gain. In terms of Guantanamo Bay
specifically, it is crucial that the international public law and human
rights legal spheres use this as case study as to how extraterritorial
state action will be considered in the future and further solidify the
individual nature of the rights in the global arena.
States cannot be permitted to believe that explicit torture and
abuse are permitted simply because their actions exist in what has
been deemed a "legal black hole" due to the territorial uncertainty that
underlines extraterritorial state activity, Human rights are individual
in nature and are triggered solely by the person's status as a human
being. Such an acceptance of the "legal black hole" would devolve the
existence of the international human rights law, as well as the legiti-
macy associated with the notion that human rights are capable of be-
ing sufficiently protected in this modern era. As Eleanor Roosevelt
stated,
The basic problem confronting the world today, as I said in the
beginning, is the preservation of human freedom for the individual and
consequently for the society of which he is a part. We are fighting this
battle again today as it was fought at the time of the French Revolu-
tion and at the time of the American Revolution. The issue of human
liberty is as decisive now as it was then.149
In order to maintain that progress, it is crucial that the dis-
course shift to speaking about the individual nature of human rights,
and to illuminate the mistakes of Guantanamo Bay to ensure that his-
tory does not repeat itself.
149 Eleanor Roosevelt Speech, supra note 19.
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